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Iuiga recorded a good start with monthly sales growing 
from 600 units in the second month to 3,000 units
by the eighth month. The upward trend was short-lived, 
however, and by the ninth month, sales growth began to 
plateau. The e-commerce brand was at a crossroads. How 
could it sustain growth? Was it simply a matter of committing 
more resources and effort behind its online platform? Or 
did it need to adopt a radical strategy and go physical, which 
was the antithesis of its core business model? 
CLICKS
CASE IN POINT
By Kapil Tuli, Sandeep R Chandukala & Sheetal Mittal
Defi ning an omni-channel strategy for Iuiga.
Iuiga is a Singapore-based e-commerce start-up that 
has eschewed the conventional e-retailing model by acquiring 
complete control over its value chain—from ownership of 
its retailed items to marketing, storage, logistics and 
distribution. Positioned as a lifestyle brand, the start-up 
targets quality-conscious customers and presents a curated 
range of high quality products at affordable prices. Iuiga 
launched its mobile app in May 2017, followed by its website 
two months later. 
In 2015, Zang Hao, the CEO and founder of Iuiga, 
and his three partners, decided to adopt the original design 
manufacturers (ODM) business model for sourcing products. 
Iuiga contracted the manufacturers of big global brands known 
for their superior quality to manufacture the same products 
for them. The products, bereft of the premium brand tags 
that commanded hefty mark-ups, were then retailed directly 
by Iuiga under its own brand name at much lower and 
transparent prices on its website and mobile app. 
BRICKS WITH
the manufacturers and get them on board. The entire process was painstakingly 
slow, riddled with numerous issues and rejections, and demanded considerable 
investment of resources. However, insights into China’s macroeconomic environment 
and the challenges faced by the manufacturing industry in the country helped Iuiga 
present an opportunity to the ODMs to expand into new markets like Southeast Asia, 
hitherto inaccessible to them, and to curtail their over-dependence on certain 
global brands. By 2018, persistent effort and adaptability gradually led the company 
to win favourable contracts with close to 200 ODMs, who produced for 
global brands such as Muji, Samsonite, Sephora, Under Armour, L’Oréal, and 
Crate & Barrel. 





FIGURE 1 Source: Iuiga
CHOOSING A CATEGORY
After careful consideration of options, Iuiga decided to opt for the home and 
living essentials category. Electronics, a mass-market product category, was 
found to be unsuitable as it was highly competitive and saturated in terms of both 
brands and retailers. Market leaders like Lazada and Challenger pursued 
aggressive pricing strategies with limited scope for meaningful product 
differentiation. The product category of mother and baby offered low competition 
and attracted quality-conscious customers with high spending power. However, it was 
deemed unsuitable as it comprised a niche market with limited scope for growth and 
did not enable natural extension into other categories going forward. 
Home and living—comprising furniture and homeware—did not have much 
competition in the Singapore market, and the category was broad enough to 
enable an umbrella approach and enable an introduction of subcategories within it. 
Within a year of its launch, Iuiga’s product portfolio expanded to include 
nine other categories such as lifestyle products, kitchen accessories, furnishings, travel 
accessories, electronics, and mother and baby. 
Adopting the ODM 
model, launching 
its own brand and 
integrating the supply 
chain allowed Iuiga to 
have control over costs 
incurred, pricing strategy 
and the value created.
The management team debated whether the company should enter into 
omni-channel retailing, and considered setting up pop-up stores. At a time when 
physical retailing was predicted to be on its last legs, and online retailing was 
being hailed as the rising star, would going physical be the right thing for Iuiga? 
Iuiga’s business model
The ODM model is  based on 
manufacturers undertaking R&D and 
product development according to a 
buying firm’s specifications, as well 
as manufacturing the final product. 
The buying firm selects the design and 
quality and places an order with 
the ODM. The ODM delivers the final 
product, which is then branded by 
the buying firm as its own and sold in 
the consumer market according to its 
pricing strategy. 
The ODM model offers a win-
win situation to both parties. With 
ODMs providing design and product 
development services at no extra cost 
to factory production, buying firms 
can focus all their resources on brand-
building, marketing and distribution. 
Manufacturers, on the other hand, gain 
by having the copyrights for product 
and design, enabling them to sell to 
multiple clients and accrue operational 
efficiency, optimal capacity utilisation 
and lower costs of production. However, 
an ODM, unlike an Own Brand 
Manufacturer (OBM), does not own 
the brand under which the products are 
sold in the consumer market. 
Adopting the ODM model, launching 
its own brand and integrating the supply 
chain allowed Iuiga to have control over 
costs incurred, pricing strategy and 
the value created (refer to Figure 1). 
Chinese ODMs were the logical choice 
for Iuiga on two counts: China offered 
high levels of innovation at the lowest 
costs of production worldwide, and 
the company founders had extensive 
knowledge, experience and a network 
in the local Chinese market. 
However, the ODM model approach 
was uncharted territory for Hao and 
his partners, and resulted in the team 
spending close to two years in China 
to identify, select and negotiate with 
SINGAPORE’S E-COMMERCE MARKET
The e-commerce market in Southeast Asia was expanding 
fast, forecasted to grow at a CAGR of 14 percent between 
2017 and 2024.1 In the region, Singapore promised to be a 
leading market, given its high Internet penetration, urbanised 
population, wealthy consumers, and a mature transport and 
delivery network. While the country’s online share of total retail 
sales was small at 5.4 percent, it was the highest in Southeast 
Asia, and poised to grow rapidly.2 The largest consumer 
segment to shop online was those between 25 and 34 years 
old, followed by those aged 35 to 44 years old.3
In 2017, the number of active Internet users in the country 
stood at 4.47 million.4 Over 90 percent of the population had 
access to the Internet and used it every day, spending an 
average of seven hours and nine minutes online per day, 
with 26 percent shopping online at least once a week, and 
58 percent at least once a month.5,6 
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and visit the website, register and 
share feedback in exchange for free 
ice cream. The launch events triggered 
many conversations on topics such as 
legal rights versus ethical practices that 
were captured widely on social media 
platforms, leading to much-needed 
publicity for the e-commerce brand. 
The ensuing debates also provided the 
company an opportunity to address 
consumer concerns, quell rumours and 
share its value proposition effectively. 
The market response was encouraging 
with sales taking off at an average of 
630 units for the first quarter, and 
growing to an average of 2,666 units 
by the third quarter, an increase of 
almost 320 percent. 
The first mover advantage allowed 
Iuiga to erect high entry barriers 
for other start-ups in the Singapore 
market, as its heavy operational model, 
characterised by high cost of inventory 
and low margins, demands considerable 
capital investment and cash flow. Iuiga 
has since forged close relationships 
with ODMs of global brands, enabling 
the company to enjoy highly favourable 
and unparalleled terms such as a 
minimum order quantity of only 100 
units compared to the industry standard 
of 2,000 to 3,000 units. 
The way forward
The upward sales trend was short-lived 
and the monthly takeoff began to 
plateau from the ninth month. Limited 
brand awareness among Iuiga’s target 
segment was identified as a key factor 
behind the slowdown as its presence was 
solely online in a market like Singapore, 
where e-commerce penetration was still 
low. Jaslyn Chan, head of marketing, 
suggested that Iuiga consider setting 
up a pop-up store, which could be an 
effective marketing channel in driving 
customer engagement. This would also 
However, the proposed physical store 
raised many concerns.
Iuiga’s business model was based 
on minimising overheads in order 
to pass on the savings to customers. 
Going physical meant more investments: 
leasing retail space, hiring more people, 
providing training, and cultivating a 
different skill set, i.e., in-person service. 
The online medium allowed the company 
to pursue a low-overhead-cost model 
and offer attractive prices for high 
quality products to its customers– 
its unique selling proposition. Would 
not the omni-channel  platform 
undermine the strength of Iuiga’s 
core business model? 
Moreover, the e-commerce start-
 
brick-and-mortar space was uncharted 
Iuiga’s business 
model was based on 
minimising overheads 
in order to pass on the 
savings to customers. 
Going physical meant 
more investments.
territory for them. They would struggle 
in managing both the online portal and 
the pop-up store. Although the CEO 
acknowledged the need to accelerate 
new customer acquisitions, he wondered 
if it would be possible to convert 
offline footfall to online traffic. What 
if the offline engagement did not 
subsequently translate into online 
purchases? Was Iuiga ready to bear the 
Using detailed market research 
and industry experience, Chan listed 
many convincing arguments for going 
physical: 
Brand building:
offers Iuiga an opportunity to enhance 
consumer engagement through tangible 
face-to-face interactions. The ability 
to touch and feel helps in minimising 
buyer dissonance, if any, by letting 
buyers assure themselves about the 
brand’s characteristics that are not 
palpable digitally. Moreover, the retail 
space acts as the company’s ‘living 
billboard’ and repeated exposure to 
it helps build awareness and positive 
brand associations.7 
New customer acquisition: 
medium commands about 95 percent 
of Singapore’s retail sales, getting 
physical may help Iuiga attract a much 
wider group of its target audience. 
Customer acquisition for Iuiga online 
is also hindered by the minimum order 
size of US$65 for home delivery. 
First-time customers may not be 
comfortable with the idea of spending 
too much on a brand they have not 
experienced before. A pop-up store 
would allow them to buy as per their 
preference, and a satisfactory experience 
will embolden them to place bigger 
orders online. 
As Iuiga makes it mandatory for all 
new customers at the pop-up store to 
first download and register on the 
The true cost of quality  
millennials and Gen Y in the 25-45 years age group. They are active Internet users 
who are beginning to set up their own households with a proclivity towards better 
quality products and value for money. The brand offers these customers a ‘same 
for less’ value proposition by positioning itself at par with premium brands for its 
high quality, but selling at much lower prices.    
What differentiates the company is its transparent pricing. Iuiga shares a 
detailed price breakdown for each item on its website and mobile app, including 
the mark-up it charges (refer to Figure 2). The transparent pricing breaks the 
assumption that price is a surrogate for quality, and is designed to reveal the 
huge premiums charged by established brands. Iuiga also differentiates itself 
from other e-tailers by offering a unique ‘next day’ home delivery service for 
orders exceeding US$65.  
Successful launch 
Iuiga’s mobile app and website launches during May-July 2017 were accompanied 
by offsite activation events at high-traffic points such as hawker centres and 
commercial centres during lunchtime. People were invited to download the app 
IUIGA’S TRANSPARENT PRICING EXAMPLE
T R U E  C O S T S  O F













FIGURE 2 Source: Iuiga
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Iuiga app, the company can seamlessly transition these 
customers from offline to online and broaden its customer 
database for e-marketing. 
Cost of brand building and customer acquisition: While 
the online channel is cheaper with no physical place to 
rent, no cost of merchandising, no salespeople to employ 
and no utilities bills to pay for, the e-platform has 
increasingly become highly competitive and saturated. To 
be able to differentiate and position itself uniquely, an 
e-brand has to invest considerably in social media platforms, 
focused marketing through e-mailers, and advertising on 
 
attracts considerable footfall in a country like Singapore 
where distances are short and people prefer to frequent 
shopping malls. More importantly, a pop-up store as a semi-
permanent space costs only a fraction of a regular brick-and-
mortar store. It is a temporary expense and thus should be 
treated as the cost of marketing rather than a channel for retail. 
Invaluable consumer insights and feedback: As offline 
showrooming allows retailers and consumers to be physically 
present in the same environment, a retailer is able to 
assess, anticipate and respond to customer needs in real time. 
Observing customer behaviour provides meaningful data 
and opportunities for cross-selling.
Omni-channel customers: Consumers’ paths to purchase 
have become increasingly non-linear, involving interaction 
with multiple touch points across both online and offline 
channels. A customer’s decision-making process includes 
the following stages: need identification, information search, 
evaluation of alternatives, purchase decision and post- 
purchase dissonance. For each stage, customers today rely 
on different channels and expect these to be seamlessly 
integrated with one another. For Iuiga, opening a pop-up 
store would be its first step towards catering to the 
millennial customers in Singapore, who, despite being 
Internet-savvy with high mobile and digital penetration, 
Complementary services: A pop-up store can help Iuiga 
provide a number of customer services that it cannot provide 
as an e-commerce-only platform such as self-collect, return and 
exchange of products. With a growing product range, a physical 
store would also be a much-required additional inventory 
holding space. Furthermore, instead of stocking the latest 
designs and products at a warehouse where no one can 
see them, Iuiga would be able to stock and display new 
products at the pop-up store for customers to check out 
and even buy. 
The brick-and-mortar option
After carefully weighing all the options, the management 
team decided to go ahead with the physical retail strategy and 
within two months, in May 2018, rolled out Iuiga’s very 
such as rent, labour and utilities expenses, the initial results 
were encouraging with a healthy growth in the number of 
customers visiting the store. Total revenues and customers 
grew over the next four months, although the basket size 
per customer had decreased. The omni-channel approach 
seemed to have borne fruit, though there was more needed 
to be done. Complacency was not an option for Iuiga.
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